

Outline of Predestination, by Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.  
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I. Part I - THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH AND THE THEOLOGICAL SYSTEMS

- A. Chapter I - Predestination according to Scripture
1. God never commands what is impossible
  2. Elect chosen by God from all eternity
  3. He has caused this election to be efficacious, so they will infallibly get to heaven.
  4. God's choice of the elect was entirely gratuitous and previous to any consideration of foreseen merits.
  5. Augustine's classic definition - "Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparedness on God's part to bestow the favors by which all those are saved who are to be saved." Augustine elaborates, "God already knew, when He predestined, what He must do to bring His elect infallibly to eternal life."

- B. Chapter II - The Teaching of the Church
1. Declarations against Pelagianism and Semipelagianism
    - a. Pelagianism - Pelagians held that grace is not necessary for the observance of the precepts of the Christian law, and that by our naturally good works we merit the first grace. First condemned by the church in the two councils of Carthage and Milevi (416). Afterward condemned in the Council of Carthage held in 418 (however, the canons of this council have been mistakenly assigned to the second council of Milevi).
    - b. Semipelagianism
      - (1) Man does not need grace for the beginning of faith or for final perseverance.
      - (2) God wills equally the salvation of all, although special graces are granted to some privileged souls.
      - (3) Predestination is identical with the foreknowledge of the beginning of salvation and of merits by which man perseveres in doing good without any special help; negative reprobation is identical with the foreknowledge of demerits. Thus, predestination and negative reprobation follow human election, whether this be good or bad.
    - c. Augustine's Critique of Semipelagianism
      - (1) Man cannot, without a special grace, have the beginning of faith or final perseverance.

- (2) The elect are loved and helped more, and thus divine election is previous to foreseen merits, which are the result of grace.
- (3) God does not will equally the salvation of all.
- d. Council of Orange (529)
- (1) Predestination to the first grace is not because God foresaw our naturally good works, nor is the beginning of salutary acts due to natural causes.
- (a) Molinist interpretation - "Whenever the free will by its own natural powers attempts to do what it can, God bestows the prevenient grace, on account of Christ's merits."
- (b) Augustinians and Thomists - To the man who does what he can with the help of actual grace, God does not refuse habitual grace.
- (2) Predestination to glory is not because God foresaw we would continue in the performance of supernaturally meritorious acts apart from the special gift of final perseverance.
- (a) Molinists - The actual grace of final perseverance is extrinsically efficacious inasmuch as our consent is foreseen by means of the scientia media.
- (b) Augustine and Thomas - The actual grace of final perseverance is intrinsically efficacious.
- (c) St. Prosper - This grace belongs properly to the elect, and is efficacious of itself.
- (d) According to Trent, the grace of final perseverance cannot be merited. Thus, predestination to the grace of final perseverance is not because of foreseen merits; it is gratuitous.
- (e) || The molinist view is rendered superfluous.
- (3) Complete predestination, in so far as it comprises the whole series of graces from the first up to glorification, is gratuitous or previous to unforeseen merits.
- (a) Molina - "To the foreknowledge which is included in predestination on the part of the intellect, there

is attached the condition of the use of free will without which there would have been no preordaining by God."

- (b) St. Thomas - "It is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him toward salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for grace. . . There is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is no distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause." (Summa - Ia, q.23, a.5.) Thus, Thomas presupposes the intrinsic efficacy of the divine decrees and of grace.

- (c) One is not more pleasing to God than another, without having received more from Him.

- (4) Hefele comments, "What seems to be an undeniable fact is, that the Church adopted (in the Second Council of Orange) the Augustinian theory in its defense of the fundamental principles against the Pelagians and Semipelagians, or original sin, of the necessity and gratuitousness of grace, and of our absolute dependence upon God for every salutary act."

2. Declarations of the Church against Predestinarianism.

- a. Lucidus (a catholic priest) retracted his views on predestination to evil in the Council of Arles (473). We should not attach too much importance to the decisions made against Lucidus, as they were made in an anti-Augustinian environment.

- b. Councils of Quierzy (853) and Valence (855).  
 (1) God wills in a certain way to save all men.

- (2) There is no such thing as predestination to evil, but that God decreed from all eternity to inflict the penalty of damnation for the sin of final impenitence, a sin which he foresaw and in no way caused but merely permitted.

## c. Council of Trent

- (1) Man is free to do good by the aid of grace, consenting to cooperate with it, though at the same time he can resist it. Thus, God predestines no one to evil; but he wills on the contrary, the salvation of all men; and Christ dies for all, although all do not receive the benefit that is the fruit of his death, "but only those to whom the merit of His passion is communicated."
- (2) Sufficient grace is given to all men, which makes the fulfillment of God's precepts possible for all those on whom these precepts are imposed. Only those are deprived of the grace of conversion who, failing in their duty, refuse it, this being something which God permits, but of which He is by no means the cause. Augustine states, "God commands not impossibilities, but, by commanding, both admonishes thee to do what thou art able, and to pray for what thou art not able to do."

## C. Chapter III - The Principle Difficulties of the Problem and the Method of Procedure.

## 1. The Difficulties

- a. How do we reconcile predestination with God's will to save all mankind?
- b. Why has God placed in the number of the elect this person and not that other? Seemingly unjust is the unequal distribution of gifts to human beings who are both by nature and by reason of original sin. (see summa theol., Ia, q.23, a.5 ad 3um)
- c. Note - "Theology. . . averts the evident contradiction; but it is not its province to prove philosophically the intrinsic possibilities of mysteries." (p. 27)

## 2. The Method to be Followed

- a. St. Thomas - The love of God is the cause of all good. Hence it follows that God wills to save all men, by making it really possible for all to keep his commandments, and hence it follows that one would not be better than another, unless we were loved more by God (Ia, q.20, a.3, 4.)
- b. St. Theresa - The greater the obscurities in the mysteries, the greater our attachment to them, because faith is of things unseen and because obscurity results not from the absurdity or incoherence of the mysteries,

but from the presence of a light too great for our feeble vision.

- c. St. John of the Cross - Predestination appears in all its transcendent obscurity, so that the soul which has gone through this ordeal may feel the necessity of rising above all human conceptions with their apparent clarity, and thus abandon itself completely to God in sentiments of pure faith, filial confidence, and love.
- D. Chapter IV - The Classification of the Theological Systems.
1. The conclusions of the theologians.
    - a. Predestination as the result of foreseen merits.
      - (1) Molinus
      - (2) Vasquez
      - (3) Lessius
    - b. Predestination as previous to foreseen merits.
      - (1) Predestination has its foundation in the divine predetermining decrees.
        - (a) Augustinians
        - (b) Thomists
        - (c) Scotists
      - (2) The theory of the *scientia media* to explain the distribution of grace that is called "congruent," and God's certain knowledge of the consent given by the elect.
        - (a) Those congruists who are of the Bellarminian and Suarezian type.
  2. The importance of the principle of predilection.
    - a. "One thing would not be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for the other."
    - b. In the philosophical order this principle seems to be a corollary from the principle of causality applied to God's love which is the cause of all good.
    - c. This principle is absolutely universal
    - d. "God's love is the cause of all goodness." It follows that God wills to make it possible for all to obey His commandments and be saved. This real possibility is a good that is the result of God's love or of His universal will to save mankind. It is not effective, however, in all cases, and sometimes God permits the presence of evil in view of a greater good.
    - e. From this principle of predilection St. Thomas deduces all his conclusions about

predestination.  
 E. Chapter V - The Standpoint of St. Augustine and his first followers.

1. The Gratuity of Predestination according to St. Augustine.
  - a. Predestination presupposes a decisive and definite will on God's part to sanctify and save freely all the elect (predestination to final perseverance is implied).
  - b. The decrees of the divine will are infallible not because God foreknows that we will give our consent, but because he is omnipotent.
  - c. Augustine teaches that predestination (to not only grace, but also glory) is gratuitous.
2. St. Augustine's first Disciples
  - a. St. Prosper of Auitaine - God wills to make it really possible for all to comply with the precepts imposed upon them and to do so when they are imposed. Thus, he wills to make their salvation really possible, though he does not lead them all efficaciously to eternal life.
  - b. St. Fulgenitius - Predestination is a certainty in virtue of God's omnipotent and unchangeable will.
  - c. St. Caesarius of Arles (470-543) - Distinguishes between God's permission of sin and the withdrawal of his grace which, as a just punishment, presupposes on the contrary that God foresees the sin.
  - d. St. Gregory the Great - The necessity of a prevenient grace for the beginning of good works and faith, and that predestination to grace and eternal life is absolutely gratuitous.
  - e. St. Isidore of Seville - God has prepared for the reprobates the punishments they have deserved for their sins which have been permitted by Him.

II. Part II - THE PRINCIPAL SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM

A. Section I - Predestination according to the Scholars of the Middle Ages.

1. Chapter I - The Theologians Prior to St. Thomas

a. St. Anselm

- (1) "God predestines the bad and their bad deeds," he says, "when He does not correct them and their bad deeds. But more especially He predestines in the case of those who perform good deeds . . . because in these He is the cause not only of their entity but also of their

goodness; but in the case of bad deeds He is the cause of their entity, not of their badness."

- (2) How is the divine action in predestination accompanied by man's cooperation? "Certain things . . . which are predestined, do not happen by reason of that necessity which precedes and is the cause of that occurrence, but by reason of that which follows it." Thus, God, when He predestines, does not do so by forcing the human will or resisting it, but He leaves it master of itself. And although our will makes use of its power, in the case of the good, however, nothing is done by it except as the result of God's grace; so that in the case of the bad, sin must be imputed solely to their will.

- (3) Anselm contends that every good comes from God, that the free determination of a salutary act in all that constitutes it as such, is a good that comes entirely from God, just as it comes entirely from us a secondary cause. It does not happen independently of God's action that this free determination of a salutary act comes or will come from this man rather than from a certain other, whom God will permit to fall into sin, the cause of which, however, will be solely because this other willed it.

b. Peter Lombard

- (1) He follows Augustine in his views of predestination and reprobation: "By predestination God foreknew those things which He Himself would do; but He foreknew also those things which He will not do, that is all evil things. He predestined those whom He chose, but the rest He rejected as reprobates, that is He foreknew they would sin and be condemned to eternal death."

- (2) When we read that "God wills to save all men," we must not take this to mean that His omnipotence meets with an insurmountable obstacle in the malice of some persons; but with Augustine we must interpret this as meaning that no one is saved unless God willed it.

c. Alexander of Hales

- (1) "By the term predestination is meant the

preparation of the divine helps, united to foreknowledge and its effects, namely, grace and glory, which latter will be given to the elect. Now merits are only the cause of the conferring of glory, and not of God's eternal choice, or of the conferring of grace."

- (2) Thus, the sinner can dispose himself for justification under the influence of actual grace.

d. St. Bonaventure

(1) Holds to Augustine's definition of predestination.

(2) Are foreseen merits the cause? He answers that predestination implies three things: an eternal design, and then its effects: justification and glorification. Now the merits of the elect are the cause of the subsequent glorification, but not of the eternal design which precedes them. Justification cannot be merited *ex condigno*, but only *ex congruo*.

(3) Bonaventure contends that God chooses one person over another because of some suitable quality in him unknown to us, and not because of any merit on his part. In this regard, he departs from St. Thomas who states that God "has no reason except the divine will."

e. St. Albert the Great

(1) His teaching is the same as Bonaventure's.

(2) Divine knowledge is the cause of things, and is not measured by them. It does not, however, prescribe the characteristic trait of necessity for all things; for there may be, as Aristotle says, a necessity of consequence without a necessity of consequent.

(3) God gives grace either because of future merits, or for some other useful purpose.

2. Chapter II - The Doctrinal Principles of St. Thomas.

a. The Principle of the Thomist Synthesis

(1) God's love is the cause of goodness in things.

(2) Thomas elaborates, "God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence,

or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that exists." (ST, Ia, q.20, a.2.)

- b. The Universal Will to Save
- (1) If, in truth, God's love is the cause of the goodness in things, then it is by reason of His will of good pleasure and His love that He gives to all men not only a human nature by which they can know and love Him in a natural way, but that He also makes it possible for them to observe the precepts of the natural law, and in this very way salvation is possible.
  - (2) God can never command what is impossible, for that indeed would be an injustice. Sin would then become inevitable, which, in such a case, would no longer be sin, and could not be justly punished either in this life or in the next.
  - (3) (St. John Damascene stated that God, by an act of His antecedent will, of His goodness wills to save all men; but, as some sin and remain in sin, by an act of His consequent will he punishes them eternally because he is just. What St. John considers from a moral point of view, St. Thomas considers also from a metaphysical point of view.)
  - (4) God's will produces infallibly the good that it wills unconditionally, even that good that has to be realized by our free act, and this without forcing the will.
  - (5) "Since the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that he wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe." (ST, Ia, q.19, a.8)
  - (6) This free mode of our acts is still an entity and therefore is included in the adequate object of the omnipotence and love of God, the Creator. Only evil is excluded from this adequate object, and

therefore God cannot be the cause of sin either directly or indirectly because of insufficient help given.

- (7) Good is the object of the will; now goodness, unlike truth, is formally not in the mind but in the things as they actually are. Hence we will, truly and simply, what we will as having to be at once realized, and this is called the consequent will, which in God is always efficacious. (Ia, q.19, a.6. ad lum)
  - (8) If, on the other hand, the will is drawn to what is good in itself regardless of the circumstances, not to a thing as it actually is, then this is called the antecedent will, which of itself and as such is not efficacious, since good, whether natural or supernatural, easy or difficult to acquire, is realized only with its accompanying circumstances. "Thus that a man should live is good, . . . but if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer . . . to kill him is good." (q.19, a.6 ad lum)
  - (9) Thus, God wills antecedently that all the fruits of the earth become ripe, although for the sake of a greater good He permits this not to happen in all cases. He also wills antecedently that all men should be saved, although in view of a greater good, of which he alone is the judge, He permits that some commit sin and are lost.
  - (10) Thus, St. Thomas explains metaphysically the notion of antecedent will by appealing to the definition of omnipotence, which should never be overlooked, and in virtue of which all that God wills simply is fulfilled.
- c. The Principle of Predilection and What it Presupposes.
- (1) On the other hand, as regards the consequent will, St. Thomas affirms the principle of predilection, which is that one would not be better than another unless one were loved more by God. (ST, q. 20, a.3, 4.)
  - (2) This principle of predilection, is the corollary of the preceding one, that God's love is the cause of the goodness of created beings.
  - (3) It seems to follow in the philosophical

order as a necessary consequence of the principle of causality, that what comes in addition to a thing in existence has a sufficient and supreme cause in Him who is being itself, the source of all being and all good.

- (4) It follows also, as a consequence of the principle of finality, that every agent acts for an end, and the purpose of the action of the supreme agent is to manifest His goodness, by reproducing a likeness of Himself, which is a more or less perfect participation of His nature.
  - (5) The principle of predilection is a revealed principle (Ex. 33:19, Rom. 9:14f, I Cor. 4:7), for it finds its special application in the order of grace which, by its very nature, is gratuitous and makes us pleasing in God's sight. (See ST, Ia IIae, q. 112, a.4.)
  - (6) The principle of predilection presupposes that the decrees of the divine will with regard to our future salutary acts, are of themselves infallibly efficacious, and not because God foresees our consent. The same must be said of actual grace.
- d. The Antecedent and Consequent Wills
- (1) The antecedent will is the principle of sufficient grace while the consequent will is the principle of efficacious grace. St. Thomas points out, "Whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place." (Ia, q.19, a.6 ad lum)
  - (2) If efficacious grace is given to a sinner, it is because of God's mercy; if it is not given to another sinner, that is because of His justice.
  - (3) God changes the will without forcing it. St. Thomas says, "God moves the will immutably on account of the efficacy of the moving power which cannot fail; but on account of the nature of the will that is moved . . . the will is not necessitated but remains free." (De malo, q.6, a.1 ad 3um.)
  - (4) The intrinsic efficacy of the divine decrees is considered a revealed truth by St. Thomas. He cites, Is. 26:12,

Prov. 21:1, Phil. 2:13, Esther 13:9, and Ez. 36:26f.

(5) Every good, even the free determination to perform a salutary act, comes from God, and entirely from Him as first cause, even though this determination comes entirely from us as a secondary cause. As St. Thomas says, "There is no distinction between what flows from free will and what is of predestination; as there is no distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause." (Ia, q.23, a.5.)

3. Chapter III - The Nature and Reason of Predestination according to St. Thomas
- Predestination is defined as, "The plan of the direction of a rational creature towards the end, i.e. life eternal; for to destine is to direct or send."
  - Predestination is in God who predestines and not in the one predestined; but its effects in the one predestined are calling, justification, and glorification.
  - Reprobation is a part of providence to permit certain ones to fall into and remain in sin (negative reprobation), and for this defection it inflicts upon them the penalty of damnation (positive reprobation). But whereas predestination is the cause of grace and of our salutary acts, reprobation is by no means the cause of sin.
  - The predestined are elected by God, so that predestination presupposes election, and this latter presupposes love. Love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination.

4. Chapter IV - The Scriptural Background for the Teaching of St. Thomas
- Eph. 1:3-6
    - Grace is given in view of a future glory, and God wills the end before the means.
    - God has chosen us, not because we were saints but that we might become saints.
    - St. Thomas observes that, for St. Paul, God's plan or His eternal decree is the reason why we are predestined, and not because he has foreseen our merits.
  - Epistle to the Romans
    - Rom. 8:28-30
      - Everything in this life contributes to the good of those who persevere

- unto the end in God's love.
- (b) Everything that directs the predestined to eternal salvation is the effect of predestination.
  - (c) Christ's predestination to divine sonship is prior to our Savior's foreseen merits, since these merits presuppose the Person of the Word made flesh and therefore His divine sonship.
- (2) Rom. 9:13-16
- (a) "In man election precedes love, for man is incited to love from a consideration of good in the object loved. . . . But God's will is the cause of all good that is in the creature, and therefore the good by reason of which one thing is preferred to another by way of election is consequent to God's will, which is concerned with His own good, and which has love as its province." Thus, "Foreknowledge of merits cannot be the reason of predestination, since foreseen merits are the effects of predestination. On the contrary, demerits, of which God can by no means be the cause, are the reasons of damnation."
  - (b) The objection is raised, "What shall we say then? Is there injustice with God?" (Rom. 9:14) Is there injustice on God's part in distributing so unequally His gifts to men who are equal by nature?
  - (c) Paul did not answer by having recourse to the foreknowledge of merits as regards the elect. He replied, maintaining it to be a mystery of revealed truth, "Is God unjust? May it never be! For he says to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion." (Rom. 9:15)
  - (d) Thus, St. Paul affirms the principle of predilection by presenting it in a new form. Our election depends neither upon our will nor upon our efforts, but upon God who shows mercy.

- c. The Gratuity of Predestination in the Theological Summa. (Ia, q.23, a.5, c. et ad 3um)
- d. The Principal Difficulty
- (1) Divine goodness, on the one hand, tends to communicate itself, and thus it is the principle of mercy; on the other hand, it has an inalienable right to be loved above all things, and is thus the principle of justice.
  - (2) It is fitting that this supreme Goodness be manifested in its two aspects, and that the splendor of infinite justice appear as the refulgence of infinite mercy.
  - (3) Evil is this permitted by God only for a greater good, of which infinite justice is the judge, and which the elect are destined to contemplate in heaven.
  - (4) "Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. . . . In things which are given gratuitously a person can give more or less, just as he pleases--provided he deprives nobody of his due--without any infringement of justice." (Ia, q.23; a.5 ad 3um)
  - (5) God does not take away what is due to anyone, for He never commands what is impossible; on the contrary, however, by reason of his love He makes it really possible for all to observe His commandments, and He even grants out of His goodness more than strict justice would demand; for He often raises men many a time from the grave of sin, when He could leave them therein.
5. Chapter V - Predestination and the Views of the First Thomists. (these first Thomists faithfully follow Thomas with regard to predestination)
- a. Capreolus - "Although God's consequent will is always fulfilled, yet it does not generally impose a necessity upon the things willed."
  - b. Cajetan - Defends St. Thomas against Henry the Ghent. Cajetan positively affirms the transcendent efficacy of the divine causality.
  - c. Sylvester of Ferrara - Also defends against Henry the Ghent, and also admits that the decrees of the divine will with regard to our

- salutary acts are of themselves efficacious.
6. Chapter VI - Predestination According to the Teaching of Duns Scotus
- a. Scotus clearly affirms the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory, as well as the intrinsic efficacy of the divine decrees and of grace.
  - b. The one who wills methodically the end and those things which are means for attaining the end, first wills the end.
  - c. Only because damnation is just is it seen to be good.
  - d. It is on the notion of merit and on the nature of the divine motion assuring execution of the divine decrees that Scotus differs from St. Thomas.
  - e. Instead of admitting a physical and non-indifferent premotion, he speaks, as we have seen, of a mysterious influx, called "sympathy" by several of his disciples. In virtue of this sympathy, created liberty inclines infallibly and freely to accept the decree of divine liberty, which virtually includes it.
  - f. The Thomists reply to this, saying that this sympathy which subordinates the created will to God, either follows as a natural consequence of the necessary subordination of the creature to God, and in this case liberty is out of the question; or else it is a moral motion, of the objective order by way of attraction, and then only the vision of God face to face can so captivate the will as to attract it infallibly.
  - g. This difference is of secondary importance.
- B. Section II - Predestination According to the Tenets of Protestantism and Jansenism.
1. Chapter I - Protestantism
    - a. Luther
      - (1) Extrinsic justification
      - (2) Luther rejects free will and so faith becomes solely God's work, without our cooperation.
      - (3) Sola fide
      - (4) Not only is eternal predestination previous to foreseen merits, but also good works performed or merits acquired in this life are not necessary for salvation.
    - b. Zwingli
      - (1) Creatures come from God by way of emanation.

- (2) Man is not free, but is to God as the instrument is to the artist. God is the cause of everything, even of evil and of sin.
- (3) Sin is truly a transgression of the law, but man commits it of necessity.
- (4) Even God does not sin in forcing man to sin, because there is no law for God
- (5) Original sin is the inclination to evil, to self-love; it is a natural malady not removed by baptism.
- (6) Instead of the Church, we have a democratic organization which includes only the elect.

c. Calvin

- (1) Some are freely predestined, and the rest are freely and positively damned.
- (2) God urges man to sin, which is, however, freely committed, in the sense that there is no exterior influence compelling man to commit sin.
- (3) There is no fatalism in this, says Calvin, but a mysterious and just will of God, although this is beyond man's comprehension.
- (4) The antilapsarians said that even before Adam's sin was foreseen, God did not will to save all mankind.
- (5) The infralapsarians said that, as a consequence of this foreseen sin, God does not will to save all mankind.

d. Condemnation of the Protestant Theses:

- (1) Session six of the Council of Trent: Canons 4, 5, 6, 17, 18.
- (2) Canon 11 - Augustine, "God does not abandon those whom He has justified by His grace, unless He is first abandoned by them."

2. Chapter II - Baianism and Jansenism

a. Baianism is a phase of naturalism which attaches great importance to the fall of Adam.

b. Jansenism

- (1) By the sin of the first man human nature became entirely corrupt, so that it was no longer capable of doing anything good.
- (2) Jansenius denied the freedom of the human will, declaring it to be completely passive and determined by the "victorious delectation."
- (3) If this delectation is terrestrial, it

begets sin; if it is celestial, it results in virtue and merit; and for this, freedom from external constraint suffices, but not necessarily freedom from interior compulsion.

- (4) Jansenism adopts a teaching on grace and predestination that excludes God's universal will to save.

C. Section III - Predestination According to the Teaching of the Post-Tridentine Theologians

1. Chapter I - Predestination According to the Theory advocated by Molina and the Molinists

a. Principles of Molinism

- (1) Molina strove to establish the sufficiency of a divine simultaneous concurrence and of a grace which is not of itself infallibly efficacious, but which moves one morally by way of attraction.
- (2) The actual grace of final perseverance for adults is not of itself efficacious, but only by reason of our foreseen consent, so that, Molina says, of two dying persons who are helped by equal graces, one dies a good death, and the other does not; sometimes even the one who dies a Christian death received a lesser grace.
- (3) The theory of the "scientia media" (middle knowledge).
- (a) Before any free decree of His will, God foresaw what a certain man would freely choose, if he were situated in certain circumstances and prompted by a certain grace.
- (b) It is not in God's power to foresee by the "scientia media" any other thing, but He could do so if the created free will were to choose something different.
- (c) This divine foresight depends upon the choice a person would make in these given circumstances.
- (4) "God willed to create this order of things preferably to any other, and in this order to confer these particular helps preferably to certain others, by means of which He foresaw these particular persons, and not certain others, will attain to eternal life, there being no cause or reason for this on the part of the adults, both

- predestined and reprobates. And so on this account we said that the use of free will on the part of the predestined and the reprobates is not the cause or reason of predestination; but this must be attributed to the free will of God."
- (5) Essential element: The essence of Molinism consists in a definition of created liberty which includes the denial of the intrinsic efficacy of the divine decrees and of grace, obliging one to admit the theory of the "scientia media." (see pp. 136-44 for an excellent discussion)
- b. The Principle Objections Raised Against Molinism.
- (1) Its definition of free will
- (a) It cannot be shown from experience that the free determination of our salutary acts is independent as such of the divine causality, and that God does not cause this in us and with us, even to the extent that our actions are performed freely.
- (b) As for the actual or active indifference, which is included in the free act already determined, this cannot be attributed univocally to God and to us, but only analogically or as of things proportionately alike, according to a participation which makes what is more intimate and better in the choice of our salutary free act depend upon God's choice.
- (2) The "scientia media".
- (a) I Cor. 4:7 and the principle of predilection preclude the possibility of a "scientia media."
- (b) The so-called "scientia media" cannot have any object; for, previous to any divine decree, there cannot be any conditionate future or any conditionate future that is determined. St. Thomas writes, "Contingent futures, the truth of which is not determined, are not in themselves knowable." In his opinion, that is true of conditionally free acts of the future as well as of absolutely

free acts of the future. God cannot see them in His essence previous to any decree; for He would see them there on the same grounds as absolutely necessary truths, and this would be a reverting to the logical fatalism of the stoics.

(c) The "scientia media" leads to the denial of God's universal causality since it takes away from the latter the better part in our salutary acts, which is their free determination. Hence it is derogatory to God's omnipotence and supreme dominion, since it claims that God cannot be the cause in us and with us that we determine ourselves to act, and that we do so freely. It lead also to the admission of a passivity or a dependence of God's foreknowledge upon this free determination of the created order, which at first is a conditional future, and then a simple future. God is no longer the cause but the passive spectator of that which distinguishes the just from the impious, who are equally helped by Him in the same circumstances. God, no longer being the first who determines by His free determination or election, is Himself determined; His knowledge is passive with regard to one thing, a determination that does not come from Him.

(3) Predestination because of foreseen merits.

(a) The relevant texts from St. Paul.

(b) God, like every intelligent being, wills the end before the means, since the latter are willed only in view of the end, and hence He wills glory to His elect before He wills the grace by which they will merit this glory.

2. Chapter II - Predestination as Explained by the Congruism of St. Robert Bellarmine and Suarez.

a. Principles of the system

(1) These theologians admit, as the Molinists do, the "scientia media," and

- deny, as they do, the intrinsic efficacy of the divine decrees and grace.
- (2) But they agree with the Thomists in this sense, that they recognize the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory, which they declare to be previous to foreseen merits not only as they are future, but even as they are conditionally future.
  - (3) In accordance with this congruism, God makes use of the "scientia media" only after he has predestined one to glory, for a distribution of the so-called congruous grace and so as to assure Himself that it will be efficacious in certain determined circumstances.
  - (4) In this way the principle is saved that God wills the end before the means, and a greater effort is made in this system than in Molina's to recognize the validity and universality of the principle of predilection.
- b. Critique of the system
- (1) In Molinism, God gives the grace which he knows to be efficacious; in this type of congruism, God gives the grace because He knows it will be efficacious. Hence even congruous grace becomes infallibly efficacious only by the consent of the human will, and this is foreseen by means of the "scientia media." Thus, the Thomists asked whether the principle of predilection is truly safeguarded.
  - (2) There is a recrudescence of all the difficulties of Molinism, which seems to posit a dependence in the divine foreknowledge as regards the creature, a passivity in pure Act, and leads on our part to determinism of circumstances.
  - (3) Congruous grace, since it is not infallibly efficacious of itself, is not an infallible means of leading the elect to glory.
3. Chapter III - The Congruism of the Sorbonne
- a. Proponents: Tournely, Habert, Ysambert, Frassen, Thomassinus, Duhamel. St. Alphonse, and John Hermann in the 19th century.
  - b. Principles of the System
    - (1) Grace is intrinsically efficacious.
    - (2) Contrary to the Thomists, intrinsically efficacious grace is not physical but

- merely a moral motion.
- (3) Intrinsically efficacious grace is required only for difficult salutary acts; for the easy acts, especially for prayer, sufficient grace, which is commonly granted to all, is the only grace that is required.
  - (4) The congruousness of grace reacts upon the will, and God has no need for the "scientia media" so that He may know what effect the grace will have.
- c. Critique of the system
- (1) Father del Prado, "The congruism of the Sorbonne rejects the "scientia media" in name, but retains it fact. Knowledge of simple intelligence is the name it gives to its knowledge, but in reality it is the same as the "scientia media," because it precedes the decree of the divine will."
  - (2) Schiffini, "The intrinsic and infallible efficacy of the divine decrees and of grace either is or is not in harmony with our liberty. If it is, why restrict it to difficult acts? If it is not, why admit it for them?"
4. Chapter IV - Predestination According to the Teaching of the Post-Tridentine Augustinians.
- a. Proponents: Cardinal Noris (1631-1704) and Lawrence Berti (1696-1766).
  - b. Principles
    - (1) God does not predetermine naturally free actions, and consequently He does not foresee them in the efficacious, preordination of his will.
    - (2) The creature in the state of innocence did not need the help of predetermining grace, and consequently God in the efficacious decree of His will had not the least knowledge of the perseverance of angels.
    - (3) God sees future free acts of the supernatural order, which acts refer to the state of fallen nature, and his seeing them is dependent upon the decree of his efficacious will.
    - (4) Human liberty is in no way affected by the divine preordinations.
    - (5) By His antecedent will God wills all men to be saved, without a single exception.
    - (6) In the dogma of predestination and grace there must be no departure from St.

- Augustine.
- (7) Morally virtuous acts, which are foreseen by God, are not the cause of our predestination.
  - (8) Predestination to glory precedes predestination to grace.
  - (9) In the state of fallen nature predestination to glory is gratuitous.
  - (10) On the part of the reprobate, original sin is partly the cause of negative reprobation.

c. Objections

- (1) The principle of predilection formulated by Augustine and Thomas is of absolute universality, and that it applies therefore not only to man in the present state, but also to man in the state of innocence and even to the angels.
- (2) Every salutary act, particularly if it is performed in a state of aridity, is not due to the victorious delectation.
- (3) When this latter is present, since it is only a moral motion, operating by way of an objective attraction, and is not a physical motion, emanating from it and moving the will to act, it cannot be intrinsically and infallibly efficacious.

5. Chapter V - Predestination According to the Teaching of the Post-Tridentine Thomists. (e.g., Bannez, Lemos, Alvarez, and Gonzalez de Albeda)

a. Principles on which they agree.

- (1) All are opposed to the theory of the "scientia media."
- (2) All defend the intrinsic and infallible efficacy of the divine decrees.
- (3) This intrinsic and infallible efficacy of grace is to be understood not as a moral motion that influences the will by way of objective attraction (for only God seen face to face could infallibly attract our will), but it is to be understood as a motion that applies our will to posit its act vitally and freely, and for this reason in opposition to moral motion, it is called physical premotion.
- (4) This motion is predetermining, in so far as it infallibly guarantees this execution of the predetermining eternal decree.
- (5) All defend the principle of predilection

- and its universality.
- (6) All defend the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory, which is prior to the foreseeing of merits.
  - (7) Furthermore, negative reprobation, by which God wills to permit sin that deprives one of glory, is prior to the foreseeing of demerits.
  - (8) The arrangement of the divine decrees
    - (a) God wills by His antecedent will to save all men, even after original sin was committed and he puts at their disposal graces that are truly sufficient; for he never commands what is impossible.
    - (b) God has a special love for and chooses a certain number of angels and men whom he wills efficaciously to save. Predestination to glory thus precedes in the order of intention the foreseeing of merits.
    - (c) God puts at the disposal of the elect intrinsically and infallibly efficacious graces whereby infallibly, although freely, they will merit eternal life and obtain it.
    - (d) God, foreseeing in his decrees that his elect will persevere until the end, decides in the order of execution preconceived by Him to grant them glory as a reward of their merits.
    - (e) But as He also foresees in His permissive decrees that others will complete their time of probation in a state of mortal sin, He positively casts them off as reprobates on account of their sins.
- b. Point on which the Thomists Differ (the notion of negative reprobation).
- (1) Alvarez, the Carmelites of Salamanca, John of St. Thomas, Gonet, and Contenson admitted that negative reprobation consists in the positive exclusion from glory. God would have refused them glory as a gift not dues to them; then he would have permitted their sins and decided finally to inflict on them the penalty of damnation on account of their sins, which is positive reprobation.

- (2) Goudin, Graveson, Billuart, and nearly all present-day Thomists reject this interpretation.
- (a) It can only with difficulty be reconciled with the divine antecedent will to save all men.
- (b) It establishes an extreme parallelism between the two orders of good and evil.
- c. The Obscure Points in Thomism.
- (1) Everything is knowable according as it is actual (see p. 178).
- (2) The real power of doing good, which does not pass over into act, remains obscure because it includes the divine permission to sin, and sin is a mystery of iniquity more obscure in itself than the mysteries of grace. Whereas these latter are in themselves light, truth, and goodness, the evil of sin is a privation of being, truth, and good. (see pp. 179-82).
- D. Synthesis (an excellent summary and synthesis of the material. See pp. 183-229.)
1. Definition of Predestination.
  2. The Cause of Predestination.
  3. The Motive for Reprobation (especially helpful).
  4. On the Certainty of Predestination.
  5. Conclusion.

### III. Part III - GRACE AND ITS EFFICACY

#### A. Chapter I - Efficacious Grace and the Sufficient Grace According to Scripture and the Declarations of the Church.

1. There are two kinds of actual interior graces; one kind is intrinsically efficacious of itself; for it causes us to perform the good act; the other is inefficacious but truly sufficient; for it gives us either the proximate or remote power to perform the good act.

a. There are graces truly and merely efficient.

(1) They are truly sufficient because they really give the power to perform a good act.

(2) They are merely sufficient because, through our own fault, they do not produce their effect, or at least the complete effect intended.

b. There is an actual efficacious grace that effectively operates, although it does not exclude our cooperation, but requires and elicits it.

2. Evidence from Scripture for this teaching.
  - a. There are truly sufficient graces, which however, are fruitless because of our resistance.
    - (1) Prov. 1:24, Is. 65:2.
    - (2) Matt. 23:37
    - (3) Acts 7:51
    - (4) II Cor. 6:1
    - (5) I Tim. 2:4f
  - b. On the other hand, Scripture affirms the existence of efficacious grace that produces its effect, the salutary act.
    - (1) Ez. 36:26f
    - (2) Phil. 2:13
    - (3) John 10:27f
    - (4) Prov. 21:1, Esther 13:9, 14:13
    - (5) Eccli. 33:13, 33:24-37
3. The antecedent and consequent wills.
  - a. The distinction between efficacious grace and sufficient grace has its ultimate foundation in the distinction between God's consequent will (which concerns good infallibly to be realized at the present moment) and his antecedent will (which concerns good taken in the absolute sense and not as considered in certain determined circumstances), such as, for instance, the salvation of all men in so far as it is good for all to be saved.
  - b. From this antecedent or universal will to save come the sufficient graces that make it really possible for us to keep the commandments, without causing anyone, however, effectively to do so.
  - c. God's consequent will in its relation to our salutary acts is the cause, on the contrary, of our effectively fulfilling our duty.
- B. Chapters II, III, & IV - The Divine Motion
  1. God moves all secondary causes to act (I Cor. 12:6, Acts 17:28).
  2. The action of the creature depends upon the divine causality (Is. 26:12, Phil. 2:13).
  3. What "physical premotion" is not.
    - a. It is not a motion such as to render the action of the secondary cause superfluous (occasionalism).
      - (1) If such were the case, secondary causes would not be causes, and, not being able to act, their presence would be to no purpose.
      - (2) Moreover, their impotence would prove that God was incapable of communicating to them the dignity of causality,

- action, and life, being like an artist who can produce only lifeless works.
- (3) Occasionalism leads to pantheism. Action follows being, and the mode of action the mode of being. If there is but one action, which is God's action, then there is but one being; creatures are absorbed in God; universal being is identical with the divine being.
- b. It is not a motion that would interiorly compel our will to choose this particular thing rather than a certain other (determinism).
- (1) The divine motion does not therefore suppress freedom of action, but actualizes it.
- (2) It eliminates only potential indifference, and in return gives it the actual dominating indifference of the free act, an indifference that persists after it is already determined.
- (3) This is the only indifference there is in God, and it persists in the unchangeable free act by which He preserves the world in existence.
- c. Neither is it simply a simultaneous concurrence (Molina).
- (1) If, in truth, the divine concurrence is merely simultaneous, it is no longer true to say that God moves secondary causes to act, since He does not apply them to their operations. But if this is so, then there is something, that is beyond the scope of universal causality of the first agent; for the influence exerted by the secondary cause is truly something. The great difficulty is this: How could the will, which was only in the state of potency, give itself this perfection which it did not possess?
- (2) If the divine concurrence is itself determined by the particular influx of the free will to function in this particular way rather than in a certain other, then God, by reason of His foreknowledge and causality, instead of determining is determined.
- d. Nor is it an indifferent and indeterminate motion (Father Pignataro).
- (1) Something real would still be excluded from God's universal causality.

- (2) It leads to a passivity or dependence in God, especially in his foreknowledge (*scientia media*) as regards our free determinations, which would not come from Him.
- e. It is not a purely extrinsic assistance given by God (Cardinals Pecci and Satolli; recently bishops Paquet and Janssens). See pp. 250-255.
4. What "physical premotion" is (see pp. 256-82)
- a. A motion and not an *ex nihilo* creation, without which our acts, created in us *ex nihilo* would not be the result of the vital action of our faculties and would no longer be ours. It is a passive motion that is received in the creature and that is consequently something distinct either from the divine action which it presupposes, or from our action which follows it.
- b. It is a physical motion, as regards the exercise of the act, and not a moral motion, or as regards the specification of the act, a motion that results from the attraction of a proposed object. Of all the agents that are distinct from our will, God is the one, moreover, who can so move it interiorly according to its natural inclination to seek universal good, which He alone was able to give it. Under the influence of this motion, it moves itself.
- c. It is a premotion according to a priority not of time, but of reason and causality.
- d. It is predetermining, according to a causal predetermination distinct from the formal determination of the act that follows it. This means that it moves our will by an intrinsic and infallible efficacy to determine itself to perform this determinate good act rather than a certain other. The determination to perform a bad act, since it is itself bad and deficient, for this reason does not come from God, but from a defectible and deficient liberty. The divine predetermining motion is therefore not necessitating, for, like the divine predetermining decrees, the execution of which it assures, it extends even to the production in us and with us of the free mode of our acts, which is still being, and thus it is included in the adequate object of Omnipotence, and besides this there is only evil.

- C. Chapter V - Conformity of This Doctrine with the Mind of St. Thomas (serves as a good summary, pp. 283-92).
- D. Chapter VI - The Different Ways in Which Physical Premotion Operates.
1. God Moves our intellect and will in three ways.
    - a. Before the act of deliberation.
    - b. After this act.
    - c. By a movement of a higher order.
  2. In the natural order God moves our will:
    - a. To will happiness in general (or to wish to be happy).
    - b. To determine itself to choose this particular good by an act of discursive deliberation.
    - c. He moves it by a special inspiration that excels any deliberation.
  3. Likewise, in a proportionate manner, in the order of grace, God moves our will:
    - a. To direct itself to its supernatural end.
    - b. To determine itself to the use or practice of the infused virtues by means of a discursive deliberation.
    - c. He moves it in a manner that excels any deliberation by a special inspiration, and the gifts of the Holy Ghost render us docile to this movement.
- E. Chapter VII - Reasons For Affirming Physical Premotion.
1. General Reasons for Admitting Physical Premotion.
    - a. God is the first Mover and first cause to whom are subordinated, even in their action, all secondary causes. Now, without physical premotion we cannot safeguard in God the primacy or causality or the subordination of secondary causes in their very action. Therefore physical premotion is the reason why all secondary causes are subordinated to God as first Mover and first Cause.
    - b. Every cause that is not of itself actually in act, but only in potentiality to act, needs to be physically promoted to act. Now such is the case with every created cause, even the free cause. Therefore every created cause needs to be physically premoved to act.
    - c. Insufficiency of other explanations.
      - (1) Simultaneous concurrence does not move the secondary cause to act; and exerts no direct influence upon it, causing it to act; but this concurrence has only a simultaneous influence with it upon its effect, just as two men pulling a boat.
      - (2) Moral motion also fails to explain it (cf. p. 298)
      - (3) It is not enough to say that God gave to

secondary causes the faculty of action. It does not establish the subordination of causes of action but merely in being. Now action follows being, and the mode of action the mode of being. Dependence in action follows, therefore, dependence in being. (cf. p. 298-300)

2. Physical Premotion and the Divine Decrees as they Relate to our Salutary Acts.
  - a. Scriptural texts: Esther 13:9, 11, 17, 14:13, 15:11; Ps. 113:3; Prov. 21:1; Eccli. 33:13f; Is. 14:24-27; Ez. 36:26-28; John 7:30, 10:27-30, 13:1, 15:5, 17:1; Matt. 24:24; Acts 2:23, 10:40f, 13:48, 17:26, 22:13-15; Rom. 8:28, 37, 9:11-18, 23; I Cor. 4:7; I Tim. 2:4; Eph. 1:4-7; Phil. 2:13.
  - b. Theological Argument - St. Thomas, "The will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner or antecedently he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place." (Ia, q. 19, a.6 ad lum)
3. Predetermining Physical Premotion and the Efficacy of Grace (cf. pp. 309-15)
  - F. Chapter VIII - The Divine Motion and the Freedom of Our Salutary Acts (cf. pp. 316-23).
  - G. Chapter IX - The Divine Motion and the Physical Act of Sin (pp. 324-40)

